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Abstract. Constitutional states, as a separate category of social structures, are progressively 
losing their economic power, as measured with their capacity to appropriate the available 
capital stock. Fiscal policies, and the corresponding institutions of public finance, play a 
significant role in the public appropriation of capital, both through direct redistribution and 
indirect incentives to private allocation. Policies evolve into institutions after 
experimentation, yet, as a species, we are not really good at experimenting with our own 
social structures. The case of New Zealand and their public reforms shows an interesting 
path, possibly to follow, so as to increase the capacity of experimenting with fiscal policies 
– and to devise more efficient institutions - through enhanced fiscal prerogatives of the 
legislative in comparison to the executive. 
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1. Introduction 
e experience social reality as a set of human interactions, and these 
interactions display various degrees of recurrence. Those, which are 
apparently the most recurrent make for us what we call the social 
structure, i.e. a canvas of predictability that serves us to put some order in all the 
other social events. For some ten generations, we have been living in a social 
structure ordered around the constitutional state as central part of the social 
structure. Everything else – business, politics, law, social activism and many other 
categories of events – are ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic’. State borders make the neat lines 
of division in our social space. Yet, it has not always been so. The presently known 
constitutional state has emerged as the outcome of successive, institutional changes 
correlated with demographic revivals after major demographic slumps, as well as 
with big waves of technological change (see for example: Braudel, 1981; 1983). 
Between 1100 and 1350, the mounting flow of population made the background for 
the first modern European state: the kingdom of Two Sicilies under Frederick II 
(1194-1250). During those 150 years, a relatively sustainable system of agriculture 
and food supply developed in Europe, reaching the frontier of capacity around 
1350. Significant demographic and economic depression followed, between 1350 
and 1450, until a reversal of trend after 1450, when wind power and waterpower 
were domesticated as the technology of mills. Another leap in the institutional 
development of the state went along, namely the tripe reign of the ‘Three Wise 
 
a† Modrzewski Kraków University, Faculty of Management and Communication Sciences, Kraków, 
Poland. 
. + 48 601 48 90 51 
. kwasniewski@afm.edu.pl 
 
W 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 3(2), K. Wasniewski, p.341-348. 
342 
342 
Men’: Henry VII Tudor, Louis XI of France, and Ferdinand of Spain. These 
monarchs created truly modern states, endowed with armies, financial systems and 
distinct administrative structures. After 1650, until about 1750, Europe experienced 
still another demographic depression. The modern constitutional, republican state 
that we know today started to emerge only after 1750, in the company of large – 
scale industry. Each technological wave, and each period of demographic revival 
required capital. The state was a major player in its creation and reallocation, just 
to mention its role as the guarantor of private property rights (see for example: 
Schlatter, 1951). 
The available statistical material allows appraising the participation of 
governments in the allocation of available capital stock (see: Penn Tables 8.1., 
Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). That observation is much shorter in historical 
perspective than the secular trends mentioned earlier: it starts in 1950. Yet, 
covering 167 countries, it gives an interesting insight. Graph 1, below, shows the 
1950-2011 trend in the ratio of public expenditures computed as a share of the 
capital stock. Two alternative versions are presented: aggregate and distributive 
average. Both measures seem to be strongly correlated and follow the same trends, 
with three distinct periods. From 1950 to the mid-1970s, governments appropriate 
a growing share of the capital stock accumulated. That period roughly corresponds 
to the widespread tendency to apply Keynesian economic policy in the developed 
economies. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, a short saddle is visible: 
the public sector first recedes, then advances. These are the first years of fashion 
for monetarism in economic policy. After 1985, when the so-called NCM model of 
economic governance starts to take root, the trend is clearly descending: the capital 
stock accumulates much faster than public sectors grow (Taylor, 2011).   
The relative withdrawal of constitutional states from appropriating capital 
balances can possibly be good news for libertarians or anarchists. Still, from 
another point of view, something could be deeply wrong with the present design of 
constitutional states, and maybe we can fix that something. It is to keep in mind 
that the constitutional state has been, so far, the only type of institutionalized social 
structure able to enforce human and citizen’s rights. Corporate structures don’t, 
because it is not their function. Collaborative structures and local governments can 
attempt to do so, but they are generally too weak in political terms. The 
constitutional state, with all its drawbacks, still seems to be a good invention, worth 
improving. 
The decreasing capacity of constitutional states to appropriate capital can come 
out of two processes. On the one hand, states can lose their economic power as 
they lose their legitimation to represent key social interests (see for example: 
Habermas, 1975; 1979; 1996; Fraser, 1990).  Secondly, economic systems may be 
adjusting, over decades, to the fact that governments tend to distort the marginal 
efficiency of capital when they appropriate it (see for example: Meade, 1958; 
Modigliani, 1961; Diamond, 1965). 
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Graph 1. 
Source: Penn Tables 8.1., Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
 
2. Experimentation with fiscal institutions – peripheral 
agencies and autonomy in the legislative 
We devise anything new and useful through experimentation. However, whilst 
we – the humans - are quite good at experimenting and innovating with 
technologies, we tend to be really conservative about social structures. The 
Database of Political Institutions, (DPI), as published by the World Bank (Beck et 
al., 2001; Keefer, 2012), allows observing that political systems have been 
becoming increasingly since 1975, i.e. since constitutional states in general stopped 
to build up their economic position in the social system. On the one hand, that 
standardization is a sign of progressive, global convergence toward what we call 
‘democratic standards’. Yet, on the other hand, standardization means less 
experimentation and less innovative ideas, whilst governance needs innovation just 
as machines do (see for example: Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956; Francis, & Francis, 
2011; Janeba, 2006; King, 2005).  
Governments appropriate capital through the institutions of public finance, 
which find their current expression in fiscal policies.Institutions are based on rules 
of conduct, which, in turn, are formalized strategies known from actual experience. 
The emergence and stabilization of institutions in any field of governance, public 
finance included, can be represented as a game with nature, where the probability 
of devising optimal institutions over n steps in the game is proportional to the 
number of experiments the players can perform in each step. Assuming that 
optimal institutions are very much an abstract term, we replace the probability of 
devising optimal institutions with the quality of institutions, measured as the 
opposite of distance from the optimal ones. In other words, the more we can 
experiment with institutions in a unit of time, the better institutions we can create.  
The modern constitutional state, which started to form after 1750, is strongly 
connected to the division of powers, as explained in ‘The Spirit of Laws’ by 
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, in 1748. The division between the 
legislative and the executive is at the heart of fiscal policies, as we know them 
today. The legislative votes the budget, and the executive uses it. That institutional 
and political pattern rules the rhythm of public expenditures, taxation, and public 
borrowing. The basic constitutional pattern of fiscal policy is that of an annual 
budget, drafted by the executive branch in the government, voted by the legislative, 
then implemented by the executive, and finally absolved by the legislative. That 
basic construct is quite slow as for the opportunity to experiment with policies. 
Most constitutional orders assume functional unity of the budget, i.e. functionally 
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there can be just one budget. Additionally, the full cycle of budgetary planning is, 
in reality, closer to three fiscal years than to one: usually, budgetary bills are being 
technically drafted some 9 months before their prospective enactment, on the 
grounds of preliminary results of implementing the current budget. Summing up, in 
our experiential game with nature, we have one experiment in each consecutive 
move, and the move is quite long. 
Two types of modifications to that basic pattern, observable in actual, 
constitutional orders, can be used to overcome that limitation and allow more 
experimentation with fiscal policies in each consecutive budgetary cycle. On the 
one hand, it is the institution of peripheral agencies. They carry out specific 
missions ascribed by specific laws distinct from the budget, and from the 
regulations of fiscal governance. These laws form the legal basis of their existence. 
The missions in question usually consist in carrying out long-term tasks connected 
to large non-wage expenditures. In carrying out these tasks, peripheral agencies 
have more fiscal autonomy than typical budgetary units: they receive subsidies 
from the current budget, but these subsidies usually do not make the full financial 
basis of their expenditures. In the same manner, those agencies can retain their 
current financial surpluses over many fiscal years. In other words, the financial link 
of executive agencies with the current fiscal flows is fluid and changing from one 
budgetary cycle to another. The cycle of capital appropriation in executive agencies 
is essentially equal to their actual lifecycle as separate units. Peripheral agencies, as 
an institution of public finance, are widely used in many countries. Still, their 
presence does not seem to increase the capacity of governments to appropriate 
capital.  
Another institution of public finance that gives more room for fiscal 
experimentation is a greater autonomy of the legislative branch in drafting and 
voting budgets. The originality of this pattern is its rarity; it is to observe only in 
one country: New Zealand. Incidentally, New Zealand is one of the rare countries, 
where the share of government expenditures in the available capital stock has been 
growing over the last two decades, and it began to grow precisely after the 
implementation of public reforms allowing that constitutional pattern.  
The entry into force of the New Zealand Public Finance Act 1989 seems to have 
been a milestone in the process, introducing a novelty at the global scale, namely 
passing from cash-based budgetary management to the accrual-based one (see for 
example: Goldman, & Brashares, 1991). Besides, the New Zealand’s fiscal order 
after the 1989 reform introduced an unusually extensive flexibility of the 
legislative organs, as opposed to the executive ones, in shaping the current fiscal 
policy. That flexibility rests on two institutions, namely: the institution of imprest 
fiscal supplying, and the prerogative to enact fiscal regulations on the own 
initiative of the legislative, without budgetary bills from the part of the executive. 
Most constitutional orders contain provisions for provisory fiscal management in 
case of problems with voting the properly spoken annual budget. Yet, in all those 
orders (to the author’s best knowledge), the attempt to vote the budget comes first, 
and only after it’s failure a financial provisory can be voted for the government. In 
the New Zealand’s fiscal order, the sequence is reversed: first comes the voting of 
provisory fiscal allocation, in an Imprest Supply Act, and the vote of the 
Appropriation Act comes later. The Imprest Supply Act plays the same role that the 
governmental budgetary bill plays in other constitutional systems. Thus, instead of 
the government having the de facto monopoly to bill fiscal allocations, the New 
Zealand’s Parliament plays that game with itself, so to say. The legislative 
proposes some fiscal allocation to itself in an Imprest Supply Act, votes it and 
looks what happens at the executive level, to vote the definitive Appropriation Act 
in a second step. Interestingly enough, the Public Finance Act 1989 provides 
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neither a unified definition of the Imprest Supply Act, nor of the Appropriation 
Act. Hence, the legislative can decide quite freely, which strand of the legislative 
work gives rise to preliminarily supplying public agents with money, on the one 
hand, and which legislative action leads to definitive budgetary appropriation. 
Section 4A of the Public Finance Act 1989 (last amended in 2004) refers to the 
authority of the Imprest Supply Act, and states that the authority given by an 
Imprest Supply Act to incur expenses or capital expenditures in a financial year in 
advance of appropriation is an authority under an Act. Yet, this provision does not 
apply unless an appropriation for the expenses or capital expenditure is made 
before the end of the financial year. Section 11 introduces the possibility of 
assigning appropriations under other acts than the appropriation act. Such 
appropriations are autonomous (they do not require confirmation by or under an 
Appropriation Act). Thus, the general principle is that allocating appropriations as 
for responsibility, administration, scope and period of validity is the exclusive 
prerogative of the legislative. The executive is left with some discretional freedom 
as for the actual use of appropriations. Still, Section 11 leaves a lot of questions. It 
technically allows any duly voted Act to provide for payments to be appropriated 
by public agents. If this principle was applied consistently, the Appropriation Act 
would be just one among many acts that regulate the spending of public money, 
and the very institution of statutory, annual budget could de facto disappear, whilst 
leaving the legislative in full control of public expenses. Going further that way, 
and assuming that being a government requires some real, actual economic power, 
we can imagine the legislative creating many parallel de facto governments for one 
fiscal year, through parallel voting and implementation of many acts with 
provisions as for the appropriation of public money. Such a system, unthinkable at 
the first sight, is even more realistic given the provision of subsection 11(2). The 
latter states that all appropriations based on duly voted acts have to be managed 
and accounted for in the same manner, as provided for the main Appropriation Act. 
Thus, there is a unified system of management and reporting with the possibility of 
free allocation of public money at the legislative level, very much in the lines of 
business management in corporate structures. 
Section 12B gives to the Crown the authority to make capital injections under 
Imprest Supply Act. The authority given by an Imprest Supply Act to make a 
capital injection in a financial year in advance of authorization under an 
Appropriation Act must be treated as an authority under an Appropriation Act, both 
regarding the current fiscal management and the emergency expenses, as long as 
the capital injection is subsequently authorized under an Appropriation Act before 
the end of the financial year.   
This self-inspired fiscal activity of the Parliament is highly unusual, as 
compared with other possible regulatory orders. The usual pattern is that of the 
legislative bodies voting over bills presented by the executive: the executive has 
the exclusivity to draft bills, and the legislative has the exclusivity to enact them 
through voting. Although some other institutions can enhance, at least in theory, 
the relative autonomy of the legislative in fiscal matters, the New Zealand’s 
approach has the peculiarity of having brought significant fiscal change. The role 
of legislative organs finds an interesting expression in the dual system of financial 
planning, through the Imprest Supply Act on the one hand, and the Appropriation 
Act on the other hand. 
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3. New Zealand and Finland – the fiscal outcomes of two 
distinct regimes 
In the context of the above it is interesting to compare two countries, New 
Zealand and Finland, as for the participation of their respective, public 
expenditures in their national capital stocks. Finland is some kind of fiscal 
champion at the global scale. Since 1980 through 2012, it maintains a positive 
fiscal balance, both at the primary, and at the structural level. On the other hand, it 
combines all the factors of political fragmentation, both constitutional and partisan. 
Thus, it is a living proof that strongly differentiated political systems can generate 
high fiscal discipline. Its reserves of public financial assets, combined with a 
noticeable gross public debt, and a net claim on the rest of the world (negative net 
debt) call for the metaphor of a bank-country. Besides, Finland has developed a 
whole structure of public peripheral agencies. They are relatively small, and 
prudently endowed agencies of the government, in charge of carrying out many 
innovative projects in the broadly spoken field of economic development. Those 
agencies are staffed with people coming from many political parties and fractions, 
and are supposed to bring together the different economic programmes into 
concrete, specific projects (see for example: Breznitz, & Ornston, 2013).  
Graph 2, below, compares three trends as for the share of public expenditures in 
the national capital stock: the global distributive average, Finland, and New 
Zealand. The span of observation starts in 1985, so at the moment when the first 
timid winds of institutional change started to blow in New Zealand, and, 
incidentally, in Finland too. One can notice that real divergence starts in 2003, 
when Finland definitely goes on following the global trend, and New Zealand starts 
to go definitely against it, with consistently increasing participation of the public 
sector in the national capital stock.According to the data published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2015
1
), the current fiscal stances of both 
countries (i.e. fiscal balance, public debt etc.) followed the same direction, 
provided, of course, for different absolute magnitudes of fiscal variables.   
 
 
Graph 2.  
Source: Penn Tables 8.1., Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer (2015) 
 
Another interesting observation about New Zealand is that at the beginning of 
public reforms the public sector was quite greedy, holding over 24% of the GDP in 
liquid financial assets (defined as the differential between the gross, and the net 
public debt), and recording a significant indebtedness. From 1985 through 1989 
(when the Public Finance Act 1989 was voted), the share of public, financial assets 
 
1 International Monetary Fund, 2015, The World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015  
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in the GDP shrank significantly, and the structural balance improved. It was 
probably the most immediate result of passing from cash-based budgetary 
accounting to the accrual based one. That transition probably terminated a lot of 
small capital pockets held by public agents through the postponement of cash 
settlements. The spectacular deflation of public financial assets, and the betterment 
of the structural balance are the most striking fiscal changes accompanying the 
reforms. Later on, over the next 15 years, public debt decreased significantly both 
in gross and net terms. Public financial assets inflated again after 2004, just as 
public debt, not to the previous levels, though. Interestingly enough, private capital 
aggregates, namely saving and investment had been changing in close correlation 
with the public ones. In general, 2003 – 2004 seem to be the moment, when fiscal 
reforms reached some kind of peak in their quantitative outcomes. Thus, when 
those reforms brought their full benefits, the constitutional state of New Zealand 
started to regain grounds as for its economic power.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The present paper attempts to open a path of research focused on the economic 
power of constitutional state. A specific line of thinking is being sketched, where 
the central variable to care for is the capacity of constitutional states to appropriate 
capital through their current fiscal policies. Whilst frown at by liberal economists, 
that capacity is the very foundation of the actual capacity of constitutional states to 
do anything else, inclusive of guaranteeing and enforcing individual rights. We can 
currently observe two interesting processes at the global scale: a progressive 
withdrawal of constitutional states from the fiscal appropriation of capital stocks, 
and a tendency to standardize models of public governance. The former means less 
economic power in the constitutional state. The latter might express a temporary 
halt in the collective learning of new patterns as for public governance. New 
Zealand, with its public reforms initiated in 1989, presents an interesting example 
of a parliamentary democracy, which had enhanced its capacity to experiment with 
fiscal policies by increasing the budgetary autonomy of the legislative. The 
constitutional order of New Zealand seems to be the first, and so far the only case 
of the legislative branch in government being able to bypass the well-known 
principle of functional unity in the budget. That creates room for fiscal 
experimentation. In the same time, by shifting the fiscal authority more towards the 
legislative branch, that institutional pattern allows better representation of various 
social interests in the fiscal policy. The fiscal performance of New Zealand proves 
that a flexible legislative can be more efficient a driver of prudent fiscal policies 
than most known ‘strong governments’.  
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